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COURT-ORDERED CRIMINAL RESTITUTION IN
WASHINGTON
Court-ordered restitution is an effective way to reduce the societal costs
of crime. When a sentencing court orders a criminal defendant to make
restitution to the victim of his or her crime, the victim is compensated, the
offender is punished or rehabilitated, and future crime is deterred. I The
benefit may be even greater when a court orders an offender to make
restitution in lieu of incarceration. The offender avoids jail or prison and the
public avoids the expense of incarceration.
Although some commentators define restitution to include community
service obligations, 2 restitution in Washington generally takes the form of
cash payments by the offender to the victim for injuries caused by the
crime. 3 Washington statutes empower sentencing courts to order restitution
as an alternative to a fine,4 in addition to any sentence imposed,5 or as a
condition of a suspended sentence, probation, or community supervision. 6
Restitution is mandatory for juvenile offenders in Washington. 7
The current statutory scheme for restitution in Washington consists of
several overlapping statutes dating from 1939.8 The number of statutes
1. See infra text accompanying notes 10-19.
2. B. GALAWAY & J. HUDSON, OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION 1 (1977).
3. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 137 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9.94A.010-.910 (1985 & Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter Sentencing Reform Act], defines restitution as
"the requirement that the offenderpay a specific sum of money over a specific period of time to the court
as payment of damages." Id. § 9.94A.030(15). The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, 1977 Wash. Laws ch.
291 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE §§ 13.40.010-.450 (1985 & Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter Juvenile
Justice Act], defines restitution as "financial reimbursement by the offender to the victim. "Id.
§ 13.40.020(17).
4. WASH. Rev. CODE § 9A.20.030 (1985).
5. Id. The Sentencing Reform Act provides that a sentencing court may order restitution as a
component of a sentence for any felony. Id. § 9.94A.140.
6. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, a court may order restitution for certain felony offenders as a
condition of community supervision when the court waives imposition of sentence or as a condition of a
suspended sentence. Id. § 9.94A.120(5)(f), (7)(a)(v). Restitution may be ordered as a condition of
probation coupled with a suspended or deferred sentence for misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors.
Id. §§ 9.92.060, .95.210.
7. The Juvenile Justice Act provides that the court "shall require the respondent to make restitu-
tion" in addition to any other punishment imposed unless the offender does not have or cannot acquire
the means to pay or is committed to confinement for a period in excess of fifteen weeks. Id.
§ 13.40.190(1).
8. The first Washington statute authorizing restitution was enacted in 1939. 1939 Wash. Laws ch.
125, § 5-b. It authorized a sentencing court to order "full or partial restitution" as a condition of
probation whenever the court deferred the imposition or execution of sentence. The present statute
authorizing restitution as a condition of probation, § 9.95.210, was based on the 1939 statute. Since
1939, the legislature has amended § 9.92.060 to authorize restitution as a condition of a suspended
sentence, 1949 Wash. Laws ch. 76, § 1, has enacted § 9A.20.030 authorizing restitution as an
alternative to a fine, 1975 Wash Laws ch. 260, § 9A.20.030, and has enacted the Juvenile Justice Act
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reflects a legislative and popular preference for restitution as a sentencing
option in Washington. 9 As the number of statutes authorizing restitution
has increased, so have the decisions interpreting those statutes. As a result,
restitution has become a complex and often confusing area of criminal
sentencing.
This survey is an overview of court-ordered restitution in Washington. It
reconciles the case law interpreting the restitution statutes currently in
effect in Washington. It compares and contrasts the statutes. Finally, it is an
effort to identify areas of the law that need additional judicial or legislative
clarification.
I. THE PURPOSES OF RESTITUTION
Commentators have justified restitution in criminal sentencing on
grounds of rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and compensation.' 0
One commentator has suggested that restitution may improve an offender's
self image and sense of control over his or her life. 1' Another concludes that
as a group, criminal defendants who are ordered to make restitution are less
likely to become repeat offenders. 12
Washington courts have looked to the purposes of restitution to guide
their interpretation of the statutes. 13 They have emphasized the penal and
rehabilitative purposes of restitution to distinguish restitution orders from
civil damage awards. 14 One Washington court has held that statutes autho-
rizing restitution in addition to incarceration are meant primarily to punish,
while statutes authorizing restitution as an alternative to incarceration are
meant primarily to rehabilitate. 15
and the Sentencing Reform Act, both of which contain separate restitution provisions.
9. A recent newspaper article suggests that restitution is gaining popularity among trial judges
nationwide. Seattle Times, Nov. 16, 1986, at A 13, col. 1.
10. See, e.g., C. ABEL & F. MARSH, PUNISHMENT AND RESTITUTION: A RESTITUTIONARY APPROACH
TO CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL 8-14 (1984).
11. Siegel, Court Ordered Victim-Restitution: An Overview of Theory and Action, 5 NEw ENG. J.
PRISON L. 135, 139 (1979).
12. B. GALAWAY & J. HUDSON, supra note 2, at 155.
13. State v. Eyre, 39 Wn. App. 141, 144, 692 P.2d 853, 854 (1984) (purposes of restitution as a
condition of probation are to aid victims and to punish and rehabilitate offenders); State v. Smith, 33
Wn. App. 791,797,658 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1983) (purposes of restitution under the Juvenile Justice Act
are to reimburse victims and to hold the juvenile accountable for his conduct); State v. Rogers, 30 Wn.
App. 653, 657, 638 P.2d 89, 91 (1981) (objectives of allowing restitution as an alternative to
imprisonment are to provide reparation to victims and prevent future offenses).
14. State v. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d 75, 79, 658 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (1985) (trial judge's order of
restitution was not an award of civil damages; primary purpose of restitution as a condition of probation
is rehabilitative rather than compensatory); State v. Martin, 36 Wn. App. 1, 5, 670 P.2d 1082, 1085
(1983), rev'd on other grounds, 102 Wn. 2d 300,684 P.2d 1290 (1984) (restitution imposed as a part of
an offender's sentence is a rehabilitative tool, not an award of civil damages).




Washington courts have also used these purposive distinctions to resolve
constitutional challenges to restitution orders. The Washington Supreme
Court has held that a defendant's due process right to a jury determination
of damages is not violated by a court order to pay restitution because a
restitution order is not an award of civil damages. 16 In reaching its decision,
the court emphasized the rehabilitative purpose of restitution ordered as a
condition of probation. 17 The court also noted that although victim com-
pensation is a valid purpose of restitution, it is a secondary purpose. 18
Another Washington court has relied on the purposes of restitution to reject
a defendant's argument that enforcement of a restitution order by incarcera-
tion amounts to imprisonment for debt. The court emphasized the purposes
of restitution to distinguish between a restitution order and a civil debt,
holding that a restitution order is not a debt under the state constitution. 19
II. LIMITS ON THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO ORDER
RESTITUTION
A. The Statutory Scheme
Washington courts lack inherent authority to order restitution and must
look to the statutes for that authority.20 Washington courts derive the power
a suspended sentence, a deferred sentence, or probation is remedial; restitution as an alternative to a
fine, however, is penal). The language of the statutes also supports this dichotomy. Sections 9.94A. 140
and 9A.20.030 provide for double restitution, while the statutes authorizing restitution as a condition of
a suspended or deferred sentence do not. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.94A.120, .92.060, .95.210
(1985). One commentator has noted that the rehabilitative value of restitution as an alternative to
incarceration lies in part with the offender's ability to "avoid the pains of imprisonment and consequent
stigma." Siegel, supra note 11, at 135, 140.
Barnett deals with §§ 9A.20.030, 9.92.060, and 9.95.210. Under the court's reasoning, however,
restitution ordered under the Sentencing Reform Act may be either penal (when ordered as a condition
of a determinate sentence) or rehabilitative (when ordered in lieu of incarceration). WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 9.94A.120(5)(f), (7)(a)(v), .140(2) (1985). But see D. BOERNER, SENTENCINo IN WASHINOTON: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SENrENCING REFORM ACT OF 198 1, § 4.8, at 4-14 (1985) (restitution provisions
of the Sentencing Reform Act have a strong punitive flavor).
16. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d at 79, 658 P.2d at 1249; see also cases cited infra note 81.
17. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d at 79, 658 P.2d at 1249.
18. The court stated that "[t]hough partial compensation may be a concomitant result of restitu-
tion, it is not the primary purpose of such an order." Id. The court's decision implies that restitution
ordered primarily to compensate the victim rather than for a penal or rehabilitative reason may violate
the defendant's due process rights. Cf. State v. Bedker, 35 Wn. App. 490, 495-96, 667 P.2d 1113,
1116-17 (1983) (trial court's order of restitution met the requirements of the law including the
requirement that probation serve as a rehabilitative tool).
19. State v. Barklind, 12 Wn. App. 818, 532 P.2d 633 (1975).
20. State v. Eilts, 94 Wn. 2d 489, 495, 617 P.2d 993, 997 (1980), questioned by State v. Barr, 99
Wn 2d 75,658 P.2d 1247 (1983) (language of the new statute effectively overrules the decision inEilts).
In an addendum to the majority opinion in State v. Mark, 36 Wn. App. 428, 675 P.2d 1250 (1984), a
case that followed the supreme court's reasoning in Eilts, Justice Ringold argued that a trial court's
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to order restitution from statutes granting authority to set the terms and
conditions of sentence. 21 The statutes give courts wide discretion to order
criminal defendants to make restitution. 22 In addition to persons, 23 defen-
dants,24 offenders, 25 and respondents, 26 courts may order corporations and
joint stock associations to make restitution under the statutes. 27 If more
than one offender is sentenced for the same offense, courts may impose
joint and several liability for restitution. 28
Restitution statutes enacted prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 198129
(Sentencing Reform Act), authorized courts to order restitution as a con-
dition of a suspended sentence for almost any misdemeanor, gross misde-
meanor, or felony. 30 The statutes also permitted Washington courts to order
restitution for any crime as a condition of probation coupled with a deferred
or suspended sentence. 31
The Sentencing Reform Act supplanted the prior sentencing statutes for
felony offenders. 32 It replaced probation with community supervision. 33 It
also abolished deferred sentences and, with limited exceptions, suspended
sentences. 34 As a result, Washington courts may no longer order restitution
authority to sentence is derived from the state constitution and not the legislature. Id. at 436-439, 675
P.2d at 1254-56.
21. State v. Bird, 95 Wn. 2d 83, 622 P.2d 1262 (1980).
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.060 (1985) (court may require the convicted person to make
monetary payments); § 9A.20.030(1) (court may order the defendant to pay an amount);
§ 9.94A.140(2) (restitution may be ordered); § 9.95.210 (court may require the defendant to make
monetary payments). But see § 13.40.190(1) (court shall require the respondent to make restitution).
The Washington Supreme Court has limited this discretion, however, by holding that a trial court may
order restitution only if it is reasonably related to the defendant's duty to make reparation and to the
prevention of future crimes. Eilts, 94 Wn. 2d at 493, 617 P.2d at 996.
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.060 (1985).
24. Id. § 9.95.210.
25. Id. §§ 9A.20.030, 9.94A.140.
26. Id. § 13.40.190.
27. Id. § 9A.20.030(2).
28. See, e.g., id. § 13.40.190.
29. Supra note 3.
30. Section 9.92.060 authorizes restitution as a condition of a suspended sentence for "any crime
except murder, burglary in the first degree, arson in the first degree, robbery, carnal knowledge of a
female child under the age of ten years, or rape .... "
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.210 (1985). Under a suspended sentence, the sentencing court
imposes sentence upon the offender but defers execution of the sentence for a period of time during
which the offender is placed on probation or community supervision. Id. §§ 9.92.060, .94A. 120(7)(a).
Under a deferred sentence, the sentencing court defers imposition of the sentence. The offender is also
normally placed on probation. Id. §§ 9.95.210, .94A.120(5). If the offender successfully completes
probation without violating the conditions of the deferred sentence (one of which may be restitution) the
court may dismiss the charges. In addition to abolishing deferred sentences, the Sentencing Reform Act
redefined "conviction" to include an adjudication of guilt. Id. § 9.94A.030(6).
32. Id. § 9.94A.010.
33. See id. § 9.94A.120(5)(f), (7)(a)(v).
34. Id. §§ 9.94A. 130, .94A. 120(7)(a)(v). Restitution has historically been a condition of proba-
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as a condition of probation coupled with a suspended or deferred sentence
for felonies committed after June 30, 1984. 35
The Sentencing Reform Act permits sentencing courts to order restitu-
tion in addition to a sentence within a predetermined sentence range 36 for
any felony "whenever the offender is convicted of an offense which results
in injury to any person or damage to or loss of property. " 37 Because the
Sentencing Reform Act abolishes deferred sentences and restricts sus-
pended sentences, courts no longer have the wide discretion that existed
under the prior statutes to order restitution as an alternative to incarcera-
tion. However, courts may order restitution under the Sentencing Reform
Act for most first time felony offenders if the court waives imposition of
sentence within the predetermined sentence range.38 Courts may also order
restitution as a condition of a suspended sentence for offenders convicted of
certain sexual offenses. 39 Moreover, courts may order restitution without
incarceration if the predetermined sentence range permits40 and when no
standard range exists for the crime. 41
Because the Sentencing Reform Act applies only to felonies, 42 Washing-
ton courts may continue to order restitution as a condition of probation
coupled with a suspended or deferred sentence for any misdemeanor or
gross misdemeanor.43 Moreover, Washington courts may order restitution
in addition to other penalties as an alternative to a fine for any crime.44
tion. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, restitution is a condition of the sentence itself when the court
suspends sentence, id. § 9.94A.120(7)(a), but is a condition of community supervision when the court
waives imposition of sentence. Id. § 9.94A.120(5).
35. The effective date of § 9.94A.130, the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act abolishing
deferred and suspended sentences, is July 1, 1984. Id. § 9.94A.905. The provision of the Sentencing
Reform Act authorizing restitution as a component of a determinate sentence, § 9.94A. 140, was signed
into law on May 14, 1981. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 137, § 14.
36. The Sentencing Reform Act provides that a sentencing court must impose sentence within the
standard range established for the crime unless compelling circumstances exist. Id. § 9.94A. 120(l),
(2).
37. Id. § 9.94A.140(2).
38. The Sentencing Reform Act authorizes restitution for first time offenders other than those
committing certain sexual offenses when the court elects to waive imposition of a determinate sentence.
Restitution is a condition of community supervision. Id. § 9.94A. 120(5)(f).
39. A court may order restitution under the Sentencing Reform Act as a condition of a suspended
sentence coupled with community supervision for a first time sexual offender unless the offender has
been convicted of first or second degree rape. Id. § 9.94A.120(7)(a)(v).
40. The standard sentence range under the Sentencing Reform Act is a function of the seriousness
of the crime committed and the offender's "score." As a result, courts may order restitution in addition
to a standard sentence that includes no jail time for less serious offenses under the Sentencing Reform
Act. Id. §§ 9.94A.310-.330.
41. Id. § 9.94A.120(6).
42. Id. § 9.94A.010.
43. The Sentencing Reform Act abolished deferred sentences and limited suspended sentences
only for felonies. Id. § 9.94A.130.
44. Id. § 9A.20.030; see also State v. Stephan, 35 Wn. App. 889,897,671 P.2d 780,785 (1983) (a
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B. Defining "Victim"
The statutes authorize sentencing courts to order defendants to pay
restitution to the "victim" '45 of the crime or to a "person" or "persons" 46
whose injury is related to the crime. The Washington Supreme Court has
construed this language to include anyone whose loss resulted from the
crime charged and proved, regardless of whether they are named as a victim
in the complaint. 47 Washington appellate courts have upheld restitution to
state agencies, 48 to the family of the primary victim, 49 or to the primary
victim's insurance company 50 under the statutes.
Although the beneficiary of the order need not appear as a victim in the
complaint before restitution is proper, the beneficiary must have been
injured. Washington courts have struck down restitution orders requiring
the defendant to contribute to a private charity 5 or to make child support
payments to his own children52 when the charity and the children were not
injured as a result of the crime.
The statutes also require some relationship between the victim's injury
and the crime committed. The language of the statutes, however, does not
clearly indicate what that relationship must be. Restitution provisions in the
Sentencing Reform Act and the Juvenile Justice Act 53 require that the
court may order restitution under § 9A.20.030 for a felony defined outside of Title 9A unless prohibited
by the defining statute).
45. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.20.030(l), 9.94A.140(1) (1985).
46. Id. §§ 9.92.060, .95.210, 13.40.190.
47. State v. Barr, 99 Wn.2d 75, 658 P.2d 1247 (1983). In Barr, the court held that restitution to the
wife and child of a negligent homicide victim was proper under the statute. The court looked to recent
amendments to the statutes to infer legislative intent that the courts should construe the statutes liberally
to allow restitution. In doing so, the court departed from its previous decision in State v. Eilts, 94 Wn.
2d 489, 617 P.2d 993 (1980), in which it held that restitution for victims not named in the complaint
exceeds a sentencing court's statutory authority. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d at 78, 658 P.2d at 1249.
48. See State Liquor Control Bd. v. State Personnel Bd., 88 Wn. 2d 368, 374, 561 P.2d 195, 198
(1977) (section 1. 16.080 defines "person" to include a state agency); State v. Forbes, 43 Wn. App. 793,
800, 719 P.2d 941, 945 (1986) (trial court did not exceed its authority by ordering restitution to state
agency for gambling losses of undercover detective); State v. Jeffries, 42 Wn. App. 142, 145, 709 P.2d
819, 821 (1985) (trial court did not exceed its authority by ordering restitution to state agency for
disability and medical bills paid to victim).
49. State v. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d 75, 658 P.2d 1247 (1983) (upholding order that defendant pay support
to child of victim); State v. Summers, 60 Wn. 2d 702, 375 P.2d 143 (1962) (upholding order that
defendant pay funeral expenses to family of deceased child).
50. See State v. Barnett, 36 Wn. App. 560, 562, 675 P.2d 626, 627 (1984) (for purposes of
restitution in criminal cases, insurers are damaged when they are required to pay claims as aresult of the
crime).
51. State v. Theroff, 33 Wn. App. 741, 744, 657 P.2d 800, 802 (1983) (order that defendant make
restitution to a private charity struck down because the payment was not related to the crime).
52. State v. Summers, 60 Wn. 2d 702, 707, 375 P.2d 143, 145-46 (1962) (order requiring
defendant to make child support payments to his own children struck down where no order to make
child support payments existed and children were not victims of the crime).
53. Supra note 3.
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victim's loss 'result' from the offense committed. 54 Statutes authorizing
restitution as a condition of probation or of a suspended or deferred
sentence permit restitution whenever the victim's loss is "by reason of the
commission of the crime in question. 55 The statute authorizing restitution
as an alternative to a fine permits a sentencing court to order restitution
whenever the defendant gains or the victim loses money or property
"through the commission of a crime." 56
Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals has interpreted this
language to require that an element of the crime charged and proved cause
the victim's injury before restitution is proper. Under this causation ap-
proach, Division One has struck down restitution ordered for damages
caused by a hit and run driver because the injury did not result from
defendant's leaving the scene of the accident, the gravamen of the offense. 57
In another decision, Division One reversed a restitution order for injuries
caused by a knife-brandishing juvenile because the juvenile injured the
victim during an assault occurring just prior to the crime for which the
juvenile was convicted. 58
The causal connection between the crime and the injury may be tenuous
under Division One's causation approach without affecting the outcome.
Division One has upheld restitution ordered for a defendant convicted of
possession of stolen property because the defendant's possession was part
of a scheme to dispose of the property that caused the victim's loss,
although the trial court did not find that the defendant actually took the
property.59 Division One has also upheld restitution ordered for shoddy
work performed by an unlicensed contractor because the victim could have
satisfied a civil damage award against the defendant's bond had the defen-
dant been licensed. 60
54. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.94A.140(2), 13.40.190 (1985).
55. Id. §§ 9.95.210, .92.060.
56. Id. § 9A.20.030(l).
57. State v. Hartwell, 38 Wn. App. 135, 138-41, 684 P.2d 778, 779-81 (1984). Other states have
also refused to allow restitution for the crime of hit and run. See, e.g., People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476,
84 N.W.2d 833 (1957) (restitution order for hit and run struck down to protect defendant's due process
rights to a civil determination of damages).
58. State v. Ashley, 40 Wn. App. 877, 700 P.2d 1207 (1985). In Ashley, the defendant was
convicted of second degree assault after he threatened the victim with a knife. The defendant and other
juveniles had assaulted the victim earlier that same night, injuring the victim and damaging the victim's
property. The juveniles also took the victim's mo-ped. When the victim returned to reclaim his mo-ped,
the defendant appeared with the knife. The trial court ordered restitution for the earlier assault,
reasoning that restitution was proper because of the close proximity of the two assaults. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the victim's injury must have been caused by an element of the assault
charged. d. at 878-79, 700 P.2d at 1208 (citing State v. Mark, 36 Wn. App. 428, 675 P.2d 1250
(1984)).
59. State v. Rogers, 30 Wn. App. 653, 656, 638 P.2d 89, 91 (1981).
60. State v. Bedker, 35 Wn. App. 490, 667 P.2d 1113 (1983). In Bedker, the defendant was
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The Washington Supreme Court has not expressly adopted this strict
causal requirement. The court has required only that the defendant stand
convicted of a crime before he is ordered to pay restitution, 61 and that
restitution be reasonably related either to the defendant's duty to make
reparation or to the prevention of future crimes. 62 The court has also held
that the restitution statutes should "be interpreted broadly to allow restitu-
tion", when it "best serves the rehabilitative goals suggested by commen-
tators. "63
Other courts have developed different approaches to limit the scope of
restitution for uncharged crimes. California courts have limited restitution
for uncharged crimes to circumstances in which the defendant's state of
mind for the uncharged or unproved crime was the same as for the crime
charged and proved. 64 Oregon courts have limited restitution to damages
that would have been recoverable in a civil action arising from the same
facts constituting the criminal activity.65
Another purpose of these limits is to prevent sentencing courts from
violating a defendant's due process rights by ordering restitution for
uncharged or unproved crimes. Under Washington law, restitution for an
injury can only be ordered after a full criminal trial in which the defendant's
due process rights are preserved.66 Sentencing courts ordering restitution
for crimes not charged and proved may therefore violate defendant's right
to trial. 67
convicted of violating § 18.27.020, which requires contractors to obtain a bond and insurance and to
register with the state Department of Licensing. The defendant did the work when she was not bonded,
insured, or registered. The trial court characterized the work done as "dangerous" and "extremely
poor." Id. at 494, 667 P.2d at 1116. In upholding the trial court's order of restitution, Division One of
the Washington Court of Appeals looked to the purposes of the contractor registration statute-to
protect the public from incompetent and fraudulent contractors-to distinguish the restitution order
from an award of civil damages. Id. at 494, 667 P.2d at 1116.
61. In re Gardner, 94 Wn. 2d 504, 507, 617 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1980).
62. State v. Eilts, 94 Wn. 2d 489, 493, 617 P.2d 993, 996 (1980), questioned by State v. Barr, 99
Wn. 2d 75, 658 P.2d 1247 (1983).
63. State v. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d 75, 79, 658 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (1983).
64. In People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 552 P.2d 97, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1976), the court applied
the following test: before a sentencing court may order restitution for uncharged or unproved crimes the
sentencing court must find by evidence on the record that the defendant's state of mind for the
uncharged or unproved crimes was the same as for the crime or crimes charged and proved. Id., 17 Cal.
3d at 623, 552 P.2d at 103, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
65. State v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 637 P.2d 602 (1981).
66. Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 1523; State v. Mark, 36 Wn. App. 428,433,675 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1984) (notwithstanding
the broad scope of amendment to § 9.95.210, the statute does not authorize restitution beyond the crime
in question or to victims of uncharged offenses). However, courts may order restitution for crimes that





Plea agreements provide an exception to the rule that a court may not
order restitution for a crime unless the crime is charged and proved. A
defendant may agree to make restitution as part of a plea agreement for
uncharged or unproved crimes as well as for the crime for which the plea is
entered. 68 The prosecutor may offer to charge fewer offenses or a lesser
included offense if the defendant agrees to make restitution for offenses not
charged. 69
Before entering a plea of guilty, a defendant must understand all direct
consequences of the plea including the possibility of restitution. 70 The
court or the prosecutor must therefore advise the defendant prior to the plea
of the possibility of restitution for the crime or crimes pleaded to or for
uncharged crimes before the court can properly order restitution for those
crimes. Washington appellate courts have considered the circumstances
surrounding the plea including any written plea agreement and defendant's
statements on the record to determine whether defendant entered the
agreement knowingly.71
The court or the prosecutor must clearly advise the defendant prior to the
plea of the possibility of restitution. One court has limited restitution to the
two crimes to which the defendant pleaded when he agreed to make
restitution for crimes he "recalled" in return for the prosecutor's promise to
leave thirty-six of thirty-eight burglary counts uncharged. 72 However, the
defendant need not know the amount the prosecutor will request or who
will be compensated. Another court has upheld restitution of $50,000 to
148 victims of one count of securities fraud when the defendant understood
only that the prosecutor would recommend restitution for the count
charged. 73
68. Identical language follows provisions in each of the statutes authorizing restitution: Restitution
for uncharged crimes is proper if "the offender pleads guilty to a lesser offense or fewer offenses and
agrees with the prosecutor's recommendation that the offender be required to pay restitution to a victim
of an offense or offenses which are not prosecuted pursuant to a plea agreement . WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 9.92.060, 9A.20.030(1), 9.94A.140(2), 9.95.210, 13.40.190(1) (1985).
69. See supra note 68.
70. State v. Cameron, 30 Wn. App. 229, 234, 633 P.2d 901, 905 (1981). Restitution is a direct
consequence of a guilty plea. Id. at 233, 633 P.2d at 905.
71. State v. Stephan, 35 Wn. App. 889, 894, 671 P.2d 780, 783 (1983).
72. In re Gardner, 94 Wn. 2d 504, 617 P.2d 1001 (1980).
73. The plea agreement stated only that the defendant understood that the prosecutor would
recommend restitution in return for charging only one of 24 possible counts of securities fraud.
Stephan, 35 Wn. App at 891, 671 P.2d at 782.
365
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III. LIMITS ON THE AMOUNT AND TERMS OF THE ORDER
A. Determining the Amount
Once a court has determined that restitution to a victim is proper, it has a
duty under the statutes to determine the amount. 74 The court may determine
the amount of restitution at the time of sentencing75 based on the evidence
at trial, or it may hold a subsequent restitution hearing if evidence on the
record is insufficient to determine the amount. 76 A formal hearing to
determine the amount of restitution is not required, however, if there is
sufficient evidence on the record to support the amount ordered. 77 Evi-
dence supporting the amount of restitution ordered is sufficient if it affords
a reasonable basis for estimating the victim's loss and the sentencing court
is not reduced to speculation or conjecture in arriving at the amount. 78 The
prosecutor need only prove the amount of restitution at trial or at the
restitution hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. 79
Defendants have challenged the authority of sentencing courts to order
restitution on the grounds that determination of the amount by a sentencing
court violates the defendant's due process right to a civil determination of
damages. 80 Washington courts have consistently rejected these challenges,
holding that a criminal defendant has no right to a jury determination of the
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.030(1) (1985) (court shall make a finding); § 9.94A. 140(l) (court
shall determine the amount); see also State v. Forbes, 43 Wn. App. 793, 719 P.2d 941 (1986). In Forbes,
Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals held that a trial court could not delegate its
responsibility under § 9.94A. 140(1) to prescribe the amount of restitution to the Victim's Assistance
Unit of the King County prosecutor's office. Id. at 800, 719 P.2d at 945. The Juvenile Justice Act,
however, requires only that the "court may determine the amount ..... WASH REv. CODE
§ 13.40.190 (1985).
75. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A. 140(1) (1985) (court shall determine the amount at a
sentencing hearing or within 60 days).
76. See, e.g., id. § 9A.20.030(l) (if the record does not contain sufficient evidence, the court may
conduct a hearing on the issue).
77. State v. Moreau, 35 Wn. App. 688, 696, 669 P.2d 483, 488 (1983) (amount of restitution
ordered under § 9.95.210 without a hearing was proper when there was evidence before the court
supporting the amount). But see State v. Rogers, 30 Wn. App. 653, 658, 638 P.2d 89, 92 (1981) (when
the amount of restitution greatly exceeds the amount proved for conviction, the trial judge must make
findings on the record of the amount of loss suffered).
78. State v. Bush, 34 Wn. App. 121, 124, 659 P.2d 1127, 1129 (1983).
79. See id. at 124, 659 P.2d at 1129 (adopting the civil measure of damages for determining
restitution); D. BOERNER, supra note 15, § 4.8, at 4-16. The Sentencing Reform Act provides that facts
admitted, acknowledged, or stated in presentence reports and not objected to at the time of sentencing
are deemed proved by a preponderance of the evidence at a subsequent evidentiary hearing. WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.370 (1985). No statute expressly places the burden of proof on the prosecution.
However, § 9A.20.030(l) states that "[it shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to investigate the
alternative of restitution and recommend it to the court .... "
80. See, e.g., State v. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d. 75,658 P.2d 1247 (1983); State v. Mark, 36 Wn. App. 428,
675 P.2d 1250 (1984); State v. Bedker, 35 Wn. App. 490, 667 P.2d 1113 (1983).
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amount of restitution.8 1 One court has held that if evidence on the record is
insufficient, due process entitles a defendant only to a restitution hearing
with an opportunity to present testimony, cross-examine witnesses, and
other trial protections. 82 The Washington Supreme Court has rejected a
similar due process challenge by emphasizing the distinction between
restitution orders and civil damage awards. 83
Courts may order defendants to pay restitution in an amount equal to
twice the victim's actual loss when restitution is ordered as an alternative to
a fine84 or in addition to a standard-range sentence under the Sentencing
Reform Act.8 5 The provisions for double restitution underscore the punitive
nature of restitution when it is ordered as a component of a sentence rather
than as a condition of a deferred or suspended sentence, probation, or
community supervision. 86
B. The Type of Injuries Compensable
The statutes contain language of varying strength and clarity concerning
the type of damages that may be included in the order. The Sentencing
Reform Act and the Juvenile Justice Act each restrict restitution to "easily
ascertainable damages" for property losses, expenses for treatment of
physical injuries, and lost wages. 87 Both statutes exclude recovery for
"mental anguish, pain and suffering, or other intangible losses." 88
81. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d at 79, 658 P.2d at 1249 (defendant's due process right to ajury determination
of damages is not violated by a court order to pay restitution because a restitution order is not an award
of civil damages); Mark, 36 Wn. App. at 435, 675 P.2d at 1254 (defendant who had an opportunity to
present testimony, cross-examine witnesses, and had other protections at a restitution hearing received
all the procedural due process due);Bedker, 35 Wn. App. at 493-95, 667 P.2d at 1115-16 (a restitution
award does not violate a defendant's due process right to a jury determination of damages if it is in fact
restitution and not an award of civil damages).
82. Mark, 36 Wn. App. at 435,675 P.2d at 1254. It is unclear whether due process requires strict
adherence to the rules of evidence at a restitution hearing. Cf. WASH. R. Evm. 1101(c)(3) (evidence rules
need not apply to sentencing hearings).
83. Bar, 99 Wn. 2d at 79, 658 P.2d at 1249.
84. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.20.030 (1985).
85. Id. § 9.94A.140.
86. See supra note 15. It is unclear whether double restitution may or should be ordered under the
Sentencing Reform Act when the court waives imposition of or suspends sentence. Section 9.94A. 140
appears to authorize double restitution for any sentence. On the other hand, § 9.94A.120, which
authorizes restitution as a condition of a suspended sentence or community supervision, does not
expressly provide for double restitution. If the purpose of restitution as a condition of a deferred or
suspended sentence is to rehabilitate the offender, and if double restitution is punitive, then courts
should not impose double restitution under the Sentencing Reform Act when the court elects to waive
imposition of or suspend sentence under § 9.94A.120.
87. The Sentencing reform act limits the recoverable injuries to "easily ascertainable damages for
injury to or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons, and lost wages
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The phrase "easily ascertainable damages" has been interpreted to refer
to the type of damages and not the burden of proof.89 Moreover, damages
may be "easily ascertainable" although disputed by the defendant. 90 One
Washington court has held that the cost of long distance telephone calls and
the costs of pursuing a civil remedy are also outside the scope of this
language. 91
Statutes enacted prior to the Sentencing Reform Act authorizing restitu-
tion as a condition of probation do not clearly define the type of damages
that may be the subject of a restitution order.92 Restitution orders under
these statutes have compensated intangible injuries and losses as well as
easily ascertainable damages. Washington appellate courts have upheld
restitution ordered as a condition of probation in excess of the fair market
value of property lost, 93 for pain and suffering, 94 for funeral expenses, 95
and for loss of consortium to the family of a deceased child 96 under these
statutes.
A restitution order does not affect the civil remedies available to the
victim or the civil defenses available to the defendant. 97 Victims may
recover losses that are not properly compensable as restitution in a collat-
eral civil proceeding subject to any civil defenses the offender may have.
resulting from injury." WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A. 140(1) (1985). The Juvenile Justice act is more
restrictive, limiting recoverable injuries to "easily ascertainable damages for injury to or loss of
property, actual expenses incurred for medical treatment for physical injury to persons, and lost wages
resulting from physical injury." Id. § 13.40.020(17) (emphasis added). It is arguable that the omission
of the word "physical" from the Sentencing Reform Act language permits recovery for psychological
injury more severe than mental anguish.
88. Id. §§ 9.94A.140(l), 13.40.020(17).
89. State v. Smith, 33 Wn. App. 791, 797, 658 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1983).
90. State v. Bush, 34 Wn. App. 121, 659 P.2d 1127 (1983).
91. State v. Morse, 45 Wn. App. 197, 723 P.2d 1209 (1986).
92. The statutes refer only to the victim's "loss or damage." WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.92.060,
.95.210 (1985). The statute authorizing restitution in lieu of a fine is more specific, authorizing
restitution for "the amount of money or the value of property or services gained or lost." Id.
§ 9A.20.030(l).
93. State v. Smith, 42 Wn. App. 399, 711 P.2d 372 (1985).
94. State v. Morgan, 8 Wn. App. 189, 504 P.2d 1195 (1973).
95. State v. Summers, 60 Wn. 2d 702, 375 P.2d 143 (1962).
96. State v. Gunderson, 74 Wn. 2d 226,444 P.2d 156 (1968), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Gosby, 85 Wn. 2d 758, 538 P.2d 680 (1975).
97. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A. 140(4), 13.40.020(17) (1985); see also State v. Barr, 99 Wn. 2d
75, 79,658 P.2d 1247, 1250 (1983) (restitution ordered as a condition of probation does not preempt the
defendant's rights to a civil determination of damages). Moreover, restitution orders are not dischargea-
ble in bankruptcy. Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353 (1986). Criminal statutes requiring a defendant to
satisfy tort judgments may violate the supremacy clause rendering the tort judgments dischargeable in
bankruptcy. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). In Perez, the Court invalidated an Arizona
statute that suspended a defendant's driver's license until the driver satisfied tort judgments resulting
from traffic accidents. The court held that a bankruptcy action stayed enforcement of the statute.
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C. Setting and Modifying the Terms
The Sentencing Reform Act and the Juvenile Justice Act grant sentenc-
ing courts discretion to fix the terms for payment of restitution orders. 98 The
Sentencing Reform Act limits this discretion by requiring the court to
specify a reasonable manner and time for the defendant to make restitu-
tion.9 9 A sentencing court may order the defendant to pay restitution in
installments under any of the statutes.' 00
A defendant who is financially unable to comply with a restitution order
may ask the court to modify the amount or terms of the order under the
statutes. Courts ordering restitution as a condition of probation for a
misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor may modify the amount or terms of
restitution at any time prior to termination of probation. 101 The Sentencing
Reform Act and the Juvenile Justice Act also give the court authority to
modify the amount or terms of the order. 102 Under the Sentencing Reform
Act and the Juvenile Justice Act, offenders who have not complied with the
order and who ask the court to modify the order bear the burden of
convincing the court that their failure to pay was not willful and that they
are financially unable to pay.10 3
A victim may recover damages from the defendant twice, once under a
restitution order and once pursuant to a civil damage award under any of the
statutes. 104 A defendant may avoid the risk of double liability by asking the
sentencing court to modify its restitution order if the victim has suc-
cessfully obtained or executed a civil judgment against the defendant for
damages resulting from the crime committed.
IV. COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORDER
A. The Willfulness Requirement
If a defendant willfully fails to make restitution, a court may revoke the
defendant's probation or impose further punishment. 105 Courts have held
that a defendant who willfully refuses to acquire the means to pay may be
98. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.140(1), 13.40.190 (1985).
99. Id. § 9.94A.120(9).
100. Id.; see also id. § 9.95.210 (court may require monetary payments); § 9.92.070 (court may
order payment of fine or costs in installments).
101. Id. § 9.95.230.
102. The statutes permit courts to modify the amount or terms or the order if the defendant's failure
to omplyis not willful. WASH. REV. CoDE §§ 9.94A.200(2)(c), 13.40.200(1), (2) (1985 &Supp. 1986).
103. Id. §§ 9.94A.200(2)(a), 13.40.200(2).
104. See supra note 97.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 114-20.
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penalized as well. 106 However, the United States Supreme Court has held
that imprisonment of an indigent defendant for failure to pay restitution is
fundamentally unfair under the fourteenth amendment 10 7 when the defen-
dant has made a reasonable effort to pay. 108
Washington courts have interpreted the restitution provisions of the
Juvenile Justice Act to give a juvenile defendant a right to a hearing to
demonstrate inability to pay. 109 Juvenile courts may order restitution in
excess of the respondent's present ability to pay10 and the burden of
showing inability to pay rests with the juvenile. "'1
Washington defendants have argued that judicial enforcement of restitu-
tion orders amounts to imprisonment for debt."12 Division One of the
Washington Court of Appeals has rejected one such challenge. In reaching
its decision, the court distinguished between civil debts and restitution,
106. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). The Bearden Court noted that the state may use
imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection when "a probationer's failure to make sufficient bona
fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution. . . reflect[s] an
insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to society for his crime." Id. at 668.
In State v. Barklind, 87 Wn. 2d 814, 557 P.2d 314 (1976), the court held that a court order requiring
the defendant to pay for the cost of court appointed counsel as a condition of probation did not violate
the defendant's constitutional right to counsel or subject the defendant to imprisonment for debt. The
court reasoned that the defendant's constitutional right to counsel is protected when probation is
revoked "[oinly if defendant willfully fails to make payments having the financial ability to do so or
willfully fails to make a goodfaith reasonable effort to acquire means to make the payment. "Id.
at 820, 557 P.2d at 319 (emphasis added).
The Barklind court did not elaborate on whether a defendant may be imprisoned for failure to make a
reasonable effort to earn enough to pay restitution or only if a defendant refuses to liquidate existing
assets to pay. Neither court analyzed whether a defendant may be imprisoned for failure to earn enough
to pay restitution if he is capable of doing so in light of the prohibition against involuntary servitude of
the thirteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
107. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666. The Bearden Court did not clearly state whether it decided the case
on equal protection or due process grounds.
108. Id.; see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (states cannot convert a fine imposed under a
felony statute into a jail term solely because the defendant cannot pay); William v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 244 (1970) (states may not subject a class of persons to imprisonment beyond the statutory
maximum because they are too poor to pay a fine).
The Bearden Court also held that the state may imprison a defendant who despite reasonable efforts
has failed to pay restitution, but only if alternative punishments are inadequate to meet the state's
interests. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672. But cf State v. Bennett, 35 Wn. App. 298,666 P.2d 390 (1983). In
Bennett, the court granted probation on the condition that defendant receive treatment as a sexual
psychopath. The court revoked defendant's probation when the hospital evaluated defendant as
untreatable. On appeal, the court held that the trial court could properly revoke defendant's probation
even though defendant's failure to comply was not willful since the condition related to defendant's
potential for rehabilitation. Id. at 301, 666 P.2d at 392.
109. State v. Fellers, 37 Wn. App. 613, 620, 683 P.2d 209, 214-15 (1984).
110. State v. Jeffries, 42 Wn. App. 142, 146,709 P.2d 819, 821 (1985); State v. Bush, 34 Wn. App.
121, 124, 659 P.2d 1127, 1129 (1983).
Ill. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.200(2) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
112. See, e.g., State v. Barklind, 12 Wn. App. 818, 532 P.2d 633 (1975).
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holding that restitution is not "debt" within the meaning of the state
constitution. 113
B. Sanctions
When a court orders restitution as a condition of probation for a misde-
meanor or gross misdemeanor, the court may revoke the defendant's
probation, impose or execute sentence, or otherwise change or modify its
order of probation if the defendant willfully fails to comply with the
order." 4 If the court has ordered restitution in lieu of a fine without
probation, it may use its criminal contempt powers to enforce the order.115
Courts placing defendants on probation for misdemeanors or gross misde-
meanors may retain jurisdiction for up to two years to enforce the order. 116
Under the Sentencing Reform Act, a court may enforce restitution
ordered for a felony conviction by imposing further punishment of up to
sixty days imprisonment for each willful violation. 117 The act authorizes
the sentencing court to retain jurisdiction over the defendant for a period of
up to ten years to enforce the order.1 8 The Juvenile Justice Act empowers a
sentencing court to enforce restitution by imposing a penalty of up to thirty
days confinement 19 and authorizes continuing jurisdiction of up to eigh-
teen months. 120
The primary responsibility for monitoring the offender's compliance
with the order lies with the offender's probation officer' 2 ' or the department
113. The court held that the proscription of imprisonment for debt described by WASH. CONST. art.
1, § 17 refers to debts arising from express or implied contract. Barklind, 12 Wn. App. at 822, 532 P.2d
at 636.
114. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.230 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
115. Section 9.23.010(4) provides that anyone who willfully disobeys an order of the court is guilty
of a misdemeanor, punishable by up to 90 days in jail and a $1,000 fine. Criminal contempt is a separate
crime that must be charged by information or complaint, and the defendant is entitled to a jury trial.
State v. Boren, 42 Wn. 2d 155, 158, 253 P.2d 939, 941 (1953).
116. Section 9.95.210, which authorizes restitution as a condition of probation, limits the proba-
tionary period to "the maximum term of sentence or two years, whichever is longer." The maximum
term of imprisonment for gross misdemeanors is one year. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(2) (1985).
Justice courts may retain jurisdiction over a defendant for two years after sentencing regardless of
whether the defendant is placed on probation. Id. § 3.50.330. As a practical matter, probation is the
most efficient way to monitor a defendant's compliance with the order.
117. Id. § 9.94A.200.
118. Id. § 9.94A.140(1).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.200 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
120. The act provides that juvenile courts may impose a term of community supervision for
collection of restitution of six months for misdemeanors and one year for felonies, with a six-month
extension if the juvenile needs additional time to pay. Id. §§ 13.40.080(4), .160(3).
121. Id. §§ 9.92.060, .95.210.
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of corrections. 122 The court may initiate a proceeding to modify its order of
judgment and to impose additional penalties on its own motion or on
motion of the prosecutor under the Sentencing Reform Act. 123 For misde-
meanors and gross misdemeanors, it is the probation officer's duty to notify
the prosecutor if the defendant violates the order. 124 The prosecutor may
then ask the court to revoke the offenders probation or to impose other
sanctions for violation of the order.
V. CONCLUSION
The statutory scheme for court-ordered restitution in Washington is
complex. Washington courts have dealt with this complexity by consis-
tently interpreting the statutes to further the purposes of restitution, to
prevent abuse of discretion by sentencing courts, and to protect the rights of
defendants.
The statutes grant sentencing courts wide discretion to order restitution
but tend to restrict the circumstances and amount in which restitution may
be ordered and the manner in which it may be enforced. Washington courts
may order restitution whenever the victim's injury is caused by the crime
committed and when the purposes of punishment, rehabilitation, or deter-
rence are furthered as a result. Courts may order restitution in an amount
sufficient to compensate the victim for tangible physical injuries and
damages caused by the crime. Moreover, courts may enforce restitution
orders with incarceration whenever a defendant willfully fails to comply
with the order.
Many questions remain unanswered by the statutes and case law. In
deciding these questions, Washington courts should continue to focus on
the purposes of restitution rather than placing undue emphasis on often
cloudy statutory language. Washington appellate courts should uphold
restitution orders whenever the purposes of restitution are furthered with-
out violation of the defendant's rights or abuse of the sentencing court's
discretion. Courts should also interpret the statutes to promote consistency
in the terms and amounts of restitution orders and in the circumstances in
which courts may order restitution.
Scott Peterson
122. Id. §§ 9.94A.140(1), .120(11).
123. Id. § 9.94A.200(2)(a).
124. Id. §§ 9.92.060, .95.210.
Vol. 62:357, 1987
